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When asked to choose between immediate and delayed rewards or costs, both human and
(other) animal respondents will equate a small reward sooner with a larger one later. This is
the well-known phenomenon of individual “discounting”. The capital interest rates that
prevail in market economies are a related phenomenon.
Most economists agree that “social” discounting should be applied to compare costs and
benefits that accrue to society at different times due to, for example, actions to reduce
environmental degradation. They cannot agree, however, on appropriate rates to use. This is
important since the policy implications tend to hinge on the assumed rate, as benefits often
lag investment costs by times that can exceed 1=% for plausible discount rates %. A high
discounting rate makes investments (for example, intervention to reduce future climate
change) appear unattractive if rewards do not accrue very quickly, even if they eventually
far exceed costs. This may seem unjust or unethical. Omitting discounting, on the other
hand, can indicate that we should be engaged in radically large investments. Much discourse
has ensued over discounting, often pitting economists against others. However, as long as
comprehensive cost–benefit analysis is to be attempted, discounting or something equivalent
cannot be avoided. A recent review of the economics literature (Spackman 2004) discusses
discounting justifications and the many controversies surrounding them. Previous editorials
in this publication (Heal 1997; Nordhaus 1997) have also touched upon important aspects.
Two key points will be discussed here. First, individual and social discounting differ in
fundamental ways, so it is important to understand the former deeply before any inferences
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can be drawn regarding the latter. The distinction is appreciated by many but not
acknowledged in foundational models of macroeconomics.1 Second, uncertainty in future
events qualitatively affects how discounting should be done. While each of these points has
been made elsewhere, poor cross-disciplinary appreciation of some key nuances may be
hindering the type of dialog needed for everyone to agree on appropriate social discounting
methods.
1 Observed discounting
The easiest way to illustrate both points is to begin by examining individual discounting
more closely. One reason for delaying expenses derives from opportunity costs or the “cost
of money” due to loss of competing investment opportunities. Such economic discounting
probably cannot explain all observed behavior (for example that in non-human subjects, or
non-economic behavior in humans). Another phenomenon known to behavioral scientists,
called “time preference,” is the seemingly innate preference for rewards sooner (or costs
later) even when there is no evident disadvantage to waiting. This is sometimes taken as a
fundamental preference that should therefore be factored into collective, as well as
individual, decisions (Baron 2000).
Observers have noticed and debated some unexpected aspects of observed individual
discounting, a particularly interesting example relating to time-dependence of the discount
rate. A constant discount rate would cause the future-to-present value ratio V to decay
exponentially with into the future t:
V ðtÞ ¼ V ð0Þð1 %Þt ð1Þ
where % is the discount rate compounded over a unit time interval. Relative valuations made
by individuals, however, tend to decay more slowly farther into the future, roughly as
(Green and Myerson 2004)
V ðtÞ ¼ V ð0Þ 1
1þ %t : ð2Þ
This implies a discount rate that decreases into the future as a hyperbolic function; such
discounting has come to be called “hyperbolic”.
This phenomenon has presented a conundrum to economists and psychologists alike, as
described by Ainslie and Monterosso (2004). It means that subjects, in effect, change their
answer as to which of two options they would prefer (a smaller reward at time t or larger
reward at time t þ %t) depending on how far into the future t is. This behavior has been
taken as irrational or “inconsistent” (Baron 2000; Van Hout 1998; Weinstein and Stason
1977) and its explanation has become a topic of interest to psychologists (McClure et al.
2004). In any case it seems to require that time preference dominate over economic
discounting as an explanation, since the latter would imply constant discounting assuming
that competing investment opportunities remain similar over time.
1 In the benchmark Ramsey model for maximizing inter-temporal welfare through savings decisions, no
distinction is possible between individual and social discounting; overall discounting is subjective and
directly connected to the market interest rate, the appearance of which therefore demonstrates discounting
(Blanchard and Fischer 1989).
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2 The risk avoidance model and hyperbolic discounting
But is the behavior so strange? We must ask why individuals exhibit time preference at all,
if not for return on investment. A reasonable answer, given readily by non-experts as well
as many experts (see, e.g., Fehr (2002)), is essentially to hedge against the risk that an
asset’s practical value to that individual (its “utility”) may decline or disappear in the future.
One could be hit by a bus tomorrow, could win the lottery so that a reward that is valuable
today becomes uninteresting, could develop an ulcer and no longer have any use for that
fine Scotch, etc. I will call this common-sense explanation of discounting the “risk
avoidance” model. Note the key role here of the distinction (traditional in macroeconomics)
between goods or assets, and utility or welfare. The risk-avoidance model makes
discounting a strategy (probably an instinctive or unconscious one) for maximizing the
expected utility of a personal asset, not an arbitrary preference for immediate gratification.
We may quantify this model by supposing that there is a probability density P per unit
time that some unexpected event will cause a asset’s utility to vanish.2 According to this
model, the optimal discounting rate % is simply equal to P. This model would, at first, seem
to support the traditional view that a time-dependent % is irrational, since it is reasonable to
suppose that the probabilities of various events, hence the risk P, are stationary in time.
But this ignores a key point: Not only does the subject not know if or when events will
occur, she does not know the value of P. We must regard P as a random variable, an
example of “deep uncertainty”. Initially, an individual will maintain some prior probability
distribution APðPÞ on the variable P, which will then evolve as evidence accumulates; this
evolution is governed by Bayesian mathematics. All that is known with certainty is that P





In other words, the individual must consider all possibilities as to the true risk P and
average over the future utility implied by each possibility.





If the uncertainty in P goes to zero, APðPÞ collapses to a Dirac delta function centered on
%, and Equation (3) reduces to Equation (1), reproducing the traditional result in which
uncertainty in P is not considered. However, any other normalized prior distribution APðPÞ
will, according to Equation (3), produce a future expectation value of utility whose log rate
of decrease declines with time. This is because EðV Þ becomes increasingly dominated
farther into the future by the contribution from the lowest possible values of P.
2 One may easily generalize this to a wider class of events with variable probabilities and fractional losses of
utility, in which case the situation is unchanged except P must be interpreted as the net risk per unit time, or
sum over all event types of the event probability per unit time multiplied by the fraction of utility lost.
3 One may contemplate events that increase an asset’s utility (say, losing one’s job); in this case, P would
still be positive but % would be negative. Empirically, our instincts must be telling us that value-increasing
events are relatively unlikely.
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What is a “realistic” prior distribution APðPÞ? If one has initially no knowledge of the
relevant events (or even a clear image of what kind of events to be worried about), then one
must initially consider essentially any positive value of P to be possible. An unrestricted
distribution APðPÞ, however, clearly must decrease with P rapidly enough for at least its
first moment % to be finite. The simplest distribution to do this is arguably the exponential
distribution AP ¼ %1expðP=%Þ.
If we insert this distribution into Equation (3) and perform some simple mathematical
manipulations (Sozou 1998), we obtain exactly the observed behavior Equation (2).
Figure 1 shows a plot of EðtÞ for a perfectly known risk, a uniform distribution of risk P
between 0 and 2%, and an exponential risk distribution, plotted together with Equation (2).
Note that “hyperbolic” behavior also arises from a more restricted prior distribution of risk,
though it is less pronounced.
3 But isn’t hyperbolic discounting irrational?
The essence of the above point – that the optimal discounting strategy when the true rate is
uncertain is to employ a time-decreasing rate – has been noted in the economics literature
(Sozou and Seymour 2003; Weitzman 2001). Weitzman (2001) documents in detail the
divergence of expert opinion on appropriate social discount rates, arguing that time-
decreasing rates should therefore be adopted, a position that is beginning to win adherents.
However, previous explanations have not fully addressed the perception of inconsistency or
irrationality that beleaguers hyperbolic discounting.
This perception rests on the assumption that the same choice posed now or in the future
should be made the same way. But options posed hypothetically for future election will be
irrelevant unless at that time the asset still retains utility; that is unlikely unless P is sufficiently
small. By contrast, a decision made now must acknowledge the full range of possible P,
including the possibility that P is very high – which a later, more experienced decision maker
will be able to rule out. The posterior distribution of P in the future, conditional on no event
Fig. 1 Discounted value plotted
against time into the future;
(lines) expectation based on risk
avoidance model for three priors
on the risk P; (asterisks) observed
behavior fitted by Equation (2)
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having occurred between now and then, will shift monotonically downward; optimal risk-
avoidance discount rates will commensurately decrease. In effect, one is worried that a life-
changing event could happen tomorrow, but has no idea how likely that is – and realizes that
if it still hasn’t happened after 10 years, it probably won’t happen in the 11th year either.
We arrive at the conclusion that the observed hyperbolic behavior, far from being
irrational, is optimal if we accept the risk-avoidance model of individual discounting. This
would seem to support both the model and the use of hyperbolic discounting.
4 Social discounting and risk
I now turn to the perplexing question of how to discount social assets. Social discounting is
sometimes expressed as the sum of a pure time preference and “consumption discounting”.
These are loosely analogous to the individual time preference and economic discounting rates
respectively. An empiricist seeking to quantify the two social discount rates might therefore
be tempted to substitute rates inferred from individual behavior, but this would be misguided.
The rate of social pure time preference captures the idea that current inhabitants of Earth
are more entitled to utility than future ones. Most commentators would set this to zero on
moral grounds, although some would follow the empiricist and argue for a positive value
that reflects evident individual preferences. I propose that, even if there were no moral
objection, this empirical argument should be rejected because there is no evidence for pure
time preference: the individual data are more elegantly explained by the risk-avoidance
model, in which utility is maximized without any inter-temporal favoritism. Further, Layton
and Levine (2003) analyzed the results of a survey explicitly asking respondents to compare
different investment and environmental change scenarios reaching into the far future, a
highly relevant study design. The authors report that results implied a discount rate of less
than 1%, indicating that despite their strong instinct to discount in everyday situations, most
people reject long-term discounting of human welfare.
It follows that we should abandon “time preference” and consider only discounting
associated with actual utility, either through (1) any losses of expected asset utility over
time or (2) the opportunity cost of tying up an asset that could be used for another purpose.
Fortunately these are both tangible economic motivations rather than subjective
preferences. The problem is how to apply them to the social case.
The utility of social assets can decrease for similar reasons as those of individuals, and
this can again be modeled in terms of risk. The relevant “social risk” must depend on future
events that would affect the utility of common assets rather than just those of an individual.
The social risk must be smaller than the individual, since any event affecting society
necessarily affects all members while the reverse is not true. Individuals discounting for
risk-avoidance reasons would be expected to discount at a rate at least equal to the
reciprocal of their expected lifespan, and indeed do so (Sozou and Seymour 2003). Past
societies have greatly outlived their individual members, even if one defines societies
narrowly; it would be wrong to discount common assets at high, individual rate if one
hopes that the society will last many human lifetimes. Not all utility-reducing events need
cause societal upheaval: Technological change can reduce utility through obsolescence. This type
of risk too will be less for society than for the individual, though perhaps not by the same margin.
An important example of this “risk” is increase in wealth, which causes a given asset to be
less meaningful; a poor person or nation derives greater satisfaction from the same goods than
does a wealthy one. This idea is accepted by economists and dubbed “elasticity of marginal
utility”. Expectations or hopes of greater future wealth (founded or not) are probably a strong
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driver of individual discounting, as evidenced by rampant high-interest consumer borrowing
in industrialized nations. A similar idea applies to social discounting but, again, at a much
lower rate, since per-capita economic growth is usually much slower than the real (or hoped-
for) growth of an individual’s income during his or her own adulthood.
Note that social utility risk too is characterized by deep uncertainty. When the atomic
bomb was first developed, for example, reasonable estimates of the likelihood per year of a
nuclear war, or of the likely duration of civilization, could easily have spanned orders of
magnitude. With the benefit of hindsight we can now rule out very high probabilities per
year of nuclear war, but face new uncertainties. Risk of asset obsolescence is also deeply
uncertain, as both the pace of change and its qualitative consequences are notoriously
unpredictable (Tenner 1997). Finally, I would argue that future economic growth is very
uncertain. Past trends in wealth have probably derived to some degree from a hitherto
plentiful, but ultimately finite, natural resource base; this may be more important than we
prefer to think. History bears multiple examples of human societies that flourished for a few
hundred years and then suffered a scarcity-induced collapse (Polynesian settlements of
Easter Island and New Zealand are particularly well-documented cases). While optimists
may point to the far greater diversity of the modern global economy, it seems unwise to
dismiss at least the significant possibility of a plateauing of growth on time scales relevant
to environmental policy. This would, of course, imply a small or even negative contribution
to the discount rate from elasticity of marginal utility.
The justification most often heard to support social discounting, however, is the
opportunity cost of lost alternatives. Why invest in costly climate-change prevention
measures if investing elsewhere would yield future returns that exceed the future costs of
inaction? This is a central question, since the key decision is always one of allocation. It
may seem straightforward that such discounting must be reckoned at the prevailing interest
rate, but this is clear only for the case of individual discounting. The social problem is much
more subtle, for two reasons. First, there is diminishing return on investment: extra
investment will attract lower rates of return than the going average, because it must move
into progressively less promising opportunities (during the investment bubble of the late
1990s marginal rates of return were surely negative). Second, any competing physical
capital investments have finite lifetimes. A new building may yield social value and
lucrative rents for a few decades, but will eventually be bulldozed or require substantial
new investment. Its former owner (or his heirs) can then reinvest the gains elsewhere and
continue to grow a personal fortune exponentially, but from that point on they would be
competing with others for a fixed array of investment possibilities rather than adding to it. It
would therefore be inappropriate to reckon opportunity costs – or the economic growth
associated with that first house – in perpetuity; otherwise, traveling back in time and giving
the ancient Greeks a few more trees or goats would, through the miracle of compound
interest, turn today’s Greece into the richest nation on Earth. An investment appreciation
time limit of order one human lifetime might be more appropriate, although this is a naked
guess. The one type of investment that unquestionably outlives all others is an investment
to avoid environmental damage, if (as in the case of climate change) recovery cannot occur
for tens of thousands of years.
5 Final remarks
Each one of the potential contributors to social discounting that I have so crudely discussed
here shares two important characteristics. First, even in the near term, it occurs at a rate that
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is arguably much lower than that of the analogous contributor to individual discounting. In
particular, individual and market discount rates seem to float above the reciprocal of one
human lifetime for various reasons that are irrelevant to social discounting. Second, it
occurs at a rate that is either highly uncertain (in the case of utility loss) or must decrease
with time (in the case of opportunity cost). And as has been shown here, uncertainty also
mathematically implies time-decreasing rates. We thus conclude that, no matter what source
of social discounting one prefers, it should be done hyperbolically and with an initial rate
well below that appropriate for individuals. Many of the high discount rates suggested by
economists in Weitzman’s (2001) survey are hard to reconcile with this.
This picture stands in contrast to the traditional approach of choosing best-guess rate
parameters (empirically or otherwise) and assuming that they are time-invariant. Such an
approach will yield disastrously wrong predictions of utility more than a few decades into
the future. Uncertainty in future events or their likelihood, and the limited lifespan of
physical investments, each force future discount rates toward zero. While costs and benefits
are also uncertain, this uncertainty does not have the same biasing effect on inter-temporal
differences in valuation.
It is hard based on these simple arguments to quantify the discounting rate. I will
however bravely (or naively) venture that the above discussion implies discounting at
something close to the real, per capita, world economic growth rate (about 1% per annum)
initially, decreasing into the future due to uncertainty. Interestingly, one obtains a similar
result if one assumes only that the discounting rate decreases hyperbolically according to
Equation (2) and with a decay time of roughly one human lifetime.
Prickly ethical questions are intertwined with cost–benefit analyses, particularly those
related to how costs and benefits are distributed vs. income and vs. agency in causing the
harm. These tend to thwart attempts at quantitative analysis. It may be best, as discussed by
Spackman (2004), to dispense with discounted, present-value comparisons altogether for
assessing environmental options. But the urge to do cost-benefit analysis will probably not
recede and discounting will therefore remain central. It is important that the assumptions
(stated or unstated) underlying these rates be considered carefully.
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